Dynamic Decentralized Algorithms for Cognitive Radio Relay Networks by Bayat, Siavash et al.
Dynamic Decentralized Algorithms for Cognitive
Radio Relay Networks
Siavash Bayat, Raymond H. Y. Louie, Branka Vucetic, Yonghui Li
Centre of Excellence in Telecommunications, School of Electrical and Information Engineering, University of Sydney,
Australia
Abstract
We propose a distributed spectrum access algorithm for cognitive radio relay networks with multiple
primary users (PU) and multiple secondary users (SU). The key idea behind the proposed algorithm is that
the PUs negotiate with the SUs on both the amount of monetary compensation, and the amount of time the
SUs are either (i) allowed spectrum access, or (ii) cooperatively relaying the PU’s data, such that both the
PUs’ and the SUs’ minimum rate requirement are satisfied. The proposed algorithm is shown to be flexible in
prioritizing either the primary or the secondary users. We prove that the proposed algorithm will result in the
best possible stable matching and is weak Pareto optimal. Numerical analysis also reveal that the distributed
algorithm can achieve a performance comparable to an optimal centralized solution, but with significantly
less overhead and complexity.
Index Terms
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I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radio has been proposed as a promising technology to improve the spectral efficiency
of wireless networks. This is achieved by allowing unlicensed secondary users (SU) to coexist with
licensed primary users (PU) in the same spectrum. This coexistence is facilitated by spectrum access
techniques, such as those involving an agreement between the PUs and SUs on an acceptable spectrum
access strategy. The key idea is that the PUs are motivated to lease spectrum bands to the SUs in
exchange for some form of compensation.
Monetary compensation has been well studied (see e.g., [1–8]), with the predominant approach for
spectrum access and performance analysis involving the use of tools from game theory. For example,
[7–9] considered a non-cooperative game between the PUs and SUs, while [4, 6] considered a two-
stage leader-follower game. For these monetary payment schemes, the PUs are assumed to have
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affected. Authors in [10] also have considered bilateral bargaining among PUs and SUs. In practice,
however, the PUs may desire higher data rates than what its current spectrum can provide.
To allow for higher data rates, the use of cooperative relaying has emerged as a powerful technique
due to its ability to exploit user diversity and provide high reliability and capacity in wireless networks
[11]. This is achieved by the use of intermediate relay nodes to aid transmission between the source
and destination nodes. The use of cooperative relaying is particularly advantageous when the direct
link between the source and destination is weak, due to, for example, high shadowing.
In this paper, we consider a model where the SUs act as cooperative relays to assist the PUs’
transmission in exchange for both spectrum access and monetary compensation, and thus the SUs
are effectively providing both a monetary and performance compensation to the PUs. When only
performance compensation is considered, this is commonly referred to as the overlay model, and
various schemes have been proposed [12–16]. However, these schemes considered the scenario where
the increase in PU’s performance does not necessarily translate into a satisfactory performance for the
SUs, and in some cases, the SUs have limited spectrum access opportunities if the PUs have regular
data to transmit [12, 17, 18]. This issue was addressed in [19, 20], where a scheme was proposed which
increased the PU’s performance while simultaneously satisfying the SU’s requirements. However,
these papers [12–14, 19–21] considered a simplified scenario with only one PU, and did not consider
monetary compensation. Besides, some works also considered a simplified scenario with multiple
PUs and only one SU.
In this paper, we propose a spectrum access strategy for a more general cognitive radio relay
network with multiple competitive PUs and multiple competitive SUs under the overlay model, which
guarantees a minimum rate requirement for all matched PUs and SUs. We define a PU and SU as
matched if the SU cooperatively relays the PU’s data, in exchange for spectrum access and monetary
compensation.
The majority of current game theory techniques in cognitive radio, which involve multiple PUs
and multiple SUs focus on a framework where only users of the same type are the primary decision
makers, i.e., either the PUs or the SUs are involved in the game to determine access to the spec-
trum resources [22]. However, in this approach, the decision makers do not take into account the
performance metric of the non-decision users, and thus will lead to unacceptably low performance
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get all users involved in the decision making process, and thus the interactions between the PUs and
SUs should be taken into account, along with the varying performance requirements of these users.
Moreover, what is not actually captured by the normal and basic game and auction models is the
fact that different spectrum resources and relaying services that are offered by PUs and SUs causes
different performance levels for the SUs and PUs respectively due to random phenomena such as:
fading, noise, and shadowing. More specifically, each PU and each SU supplies a spectrum and
relaying service with a specific and unique rate performance for a SU and a PU respectively. Thus to
model such a complex interaction between multiple spectrum suppliers and multiple relaying service
suppliers, a more flexible tool is required. Current algorithms in cognitive radio literature addressing
this issue have thus far focused on centralized-approaches, e.g., the double-auction approach in [23].
This approach is clearly not desirable in practice due to the significant amount of overhead required
in centralized coordination.
In this paper, we develop a new distributed spectrum access framework based on auction and
matching theory. The proposed distributed algorithms will match the PUs with the SUs based on
a preference list, which is unique to each user, and based on both monetary and performance
compensations. Matching users belonging to two different groups (e.g., a PU group and a SU group)
based on preference lists has its roots in the dynamic matching theory [24, 25], which was used to
match users based on a preference list, and recently applied to wireless resource allocation problems
[26, 27]. However, the algorithms based on the classic matching theory did not consider the possibility
of dynamic negotiation between the PUs and the SUs with time-varying requirements, which is
desirable for users in next generation wireless access networks.
To address this issue, we propose a novel dynamic negotiation algorithm based on multi-item
auction theory [25, 28] and matching theory that requires an intelligent negotiation mechanism, where
the PUs and the SUs choose between either prioritizing monetary or performance compensation. Our
algorithm determines the matched pairings between PUs and SUs, such that the SU will provide
monetary compensation, and relay its paired PU’s data in exchange for spectrum access. The key idea
behind the algorithm is that the PUs negotiate with the SUs on the amount of monetary compensation,
in addition to the time the SUs are either (i) allowed access to the spectrum, or (ii) cooperatively
relaying the PU’s data, such that both the PUs’ and the SUs’ minimum rate requirement are satisfied.
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sible stable matching, and is weak Pareto optimal. We introduce a utility function, which incorporates
both the rate and monetary factors. We demonstrate through numerical analysis that the algorithm
can achieve utilities (i) comparable to the utilities achieved by an optimal centralized algorithm, and
(ii) significantly greater than the utilities achieved by a random matching algorithm that is mixed
with a basic negotiation, while also being able to accomplish a high number of matchings with low
overhead and complexity.
When only the rate is important, and monetary compensation is not a priority, we show that our
algorithm is flexible in terms of prioritizing either the PUs or SUs, by a simple manipulation of global
parameter values. This is in contrast to [29], in which this design flexibility was not achievable. Note
that considering this extra monetary parameter is a significant extension to the algorithm presented
in [29], as considerable changes to the algorithm are required. Moreover, in contrast to [29], we
also present additional analyses including (i) proving that our algorithm results in the best stable
matching over all possible stable matchings, (ii) providing an explicit upper bound expression for the
number of iterations required for convergence of the proposed algorithm, (iii) presenting an explicit
expression for the overhead and (iv) analyzing the complexity performance of our proposed scheme
compared to a baseline centralized scheme. Finally, we show that the PUs, which utilize the SUs for
cooperative relaying achieve a rate greater than what it would achieve without cooperative relaying,
i.e, direct transmission, and thus motivates their participation in the proposed algorithm.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we first describe our system model. We then
formulate the optimization problem we are trying to solve in Section III, and present a distributed
solution to this problem in Section IV. Finally, we analyze the performance and the implementation
aspects of our proposed algorithm in Section V. For convenience, Table I provides a description of
some of the parameter values we will be utilizing in this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider an overlay cognitive radio wireless network, comprising of LPU PU transmitter
{PTi}LPUi=1 –PU receiver {PRi}LPUi=1 pairs, with the th pair having a rate requirement of RPU,req, and
with each pair occupying a unique spectrum band of constant size. In the same network, there are LSU
SU transmitter {STi}LSUi=1 –SU receiver {SRi}LSUi=1 pairs, with the qth pair having a rate requirement
of RSUq ,req, and seeking to obtain access to one spectrum band occupied by a (PT,PR) pair. We
5Fig. 1. Secondary user and primary user spectrum-access model. The channel and price and time-slot allocation numbers are indicated
for (PT,PR) and (STq, SRq).
assume that there are T time-slots per transmission frame, and each (ST, SR) pair has access to a
monetary value C.
Each PT attempts to grant spectrum access to a unique (ST, SR) pair, as determined by the various
matching algorithms, described in Sections III and IV, in exchange for (i) the ST cooperatively
relaying the PT’s data to the corresponding PR, and (ii) monetary compensation. In particular,
without loss of generality (w.l.o.g), let us consider (PT,PR), whose transmission is relayed by
STq during a fraction β,q (0≤β,q≤1) of T , whilst also receiving a fraction ξ,q (0≤ξ,q≤1) of C
from STq, as depicted in Figure 1. We will refer to ξ,q and β,q as the price and time-slot allocation
numbers, respectively, whose exact values will be determined by the matching algorithms described
in Sections III and IV.
During the cooperative relaying stage in the initial β,qT time-slots, a fraction τ,q (0<τ,q<1) is
first allocated for PT to broadcast its signal to STq and PR, thus occurring in the first β,qτ,qT
time-slots. In the subsequent β,q(1− τ,q)T time-slots, STq cooperatively relays the signal from PT
to PR. PR and then applies maximum ratio combining (MRC) to the signal received from PT
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time-slots. After this cooperative relaying stage, PT ceases transmission, allowing STq to transmit
to SRq over the spectrum occupied by (PT,PR) in the final (1− β,q)T time-slots.
In this paper, we consider the amplify-and-forward (AF) relaying protocol, due to its simple and
practical operation, and thus set τ,q=12 . We note, however, that the proposed algorithm is applicable
to any relaying protocol, such as the decode-and-forward or compress-and-forward protocol. The AF
gain at STq is chosen such that its instantaneous transmission power is constrained to PSUq .
A. Utility Functions
To evaluate the performance of each (PT,PR) and (ST, SR) pair, we consider the utility function,
which comprises of both rate and monetary factors. The utility function is a concept, which shows
the level of satisfaction of a user by combining all parameters to a single number. It represents the
net losses and gains of a user [30]. These parameters can be of different types, and by using suitable
weights can be combined together.
Utility functions have been widely used in wireless literature to solve various radio resource
management problems [31–33]. These papers include combining different parameters, such as price,
delay, signal-to-interference and noise ratio, power, rate, error performance, into a single number.
Specifically in cognitive radio, the utility function have been used in [1, 4, 9, 34–36].
For (PT,PR), the achievable instantaneous rate is given by [11]
RPU,q(β,q)=
β,qT
2
log2
(
1 + ΓDirPR + Γ
Relay
PR,q
)
(1)
where
ΓDirPR=
γPT||hPT,PR ||2
dαPT,PR
(2)
is the receive signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) at PR of the direct signal from PT,
ΓRelayPR,q=
ΓPT−STqΓSTq−PR
ΓPT−STqΓSTq−PR + 1
(3)
is the equivalent receive SNR of the relayed signal at PR from STq, ΓPT−STq=
γPT ||hPT,STq ||2
dαPT,STq
,
ΓSTq−PR=
γSTq ||hSTq,PR ||2
dαSTq,PR
, γPT=
PPT
σ2
is the transmit SNR for PT, γSTq=
PSTq
σ2
is the transmit SNR
for STq, σ2 is the noise variance, PPT is the transmission power at PT, hPT,PR and dPT,PR denote
respectively the channel and distance from PT to PR, hPT,STq and dPT,STq are respectively the
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from STq to PR and α is the path loss exponent. We also consider a slowly varying block fading
channel model with a sufficiently long coherence time that is constant over the transmission frame
T .
Similar to the utility functions defined in [9, 12, 34–36] we define
UPU,q(β,q, ξ,q)=RPU,q(β,q) + c¯ξ,qC (4)
where c¯∈R+, is a variable with unit defined as: rate per unit monetary value.
For (STq, SRq), the achievable instantaneous rate is given by
RSUq,(β,q)=(1− β,q)T log2
(
1 + ΓSRq,
)
(5)
where
ΓSRq,=
γSTq ||hSTq ,SRq ,||2
dαSTq ,SRq
(6)
is the receive SNR at SRq of the direct transmission signal from STq, hSTq ,SRq , is the channel
coefficient from STq to SRq in the spectrum band occupied by (PT,PR) and dST,SRq is the
distance from STq to SRq. The utility for (STq, SRq) is thus given by
USUq,(β,q, ξ,q)=RSUq,(β,q)− k¯ξ,qC, (7)
where k¯∈R+ is a variable with unit defined as: rate per unit monetary value. We consider a general
case where c¯ and k¯ have the same units, but their values may be different. This is to allow for
flexibility in the algorithm design, as will be discussed in Section V.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we describe the optimization problem we aim to address. To proceed, we in-
troduce some notations. We first define the primary and secondary user sets, respectively, as P=
{PU=(PT,PR)}LPU=1 and S={SUq=(STq, SRq)}LSUq=1 . Moreover, we define a LPU ×LSU matching
matrix M, with mi,j=1 if PUi is matched with SUj , and mi,j=0 otherwise, where the notation
mi,j denotes the (i, j)th entry of matrix M. From this matrix, we introduce an injective function
μ:(P ∪ S)→(P ∪ S ∪ {∅}), such that
(a) μ(PU)∈(S ∪ {∅}),
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PARAMETER DESCRIPTIONS
Notation Description
ξ,q Price allocation number
β,q Time-slot allocation number
T Length of transmission frame
C Total money each SU has access to in each trans-
mission frame
τ,q Time-slot fraction that PT transmits its signal to
STq
α Path loss exponent
ΓDirPR
Receive SNR at PR of the direct transmission
signal from PT
ΓRelayPR,q
Equivalent receive SNR of the relayed signal at PR
from STq
ΓSRq, Receive SNR at SRq of the direct transmission
signal from STq
γPT Transmit signal-to-noise-ratio for PT
γSTq Transmit signal-to-noise-ratio for STq
c¯ Rate per unit monetary value for PT
k¯ Rate per unit monetary value for ST
UPU,q PU’s utility while cooperating with STq
USUq, SUq’s utility while cooperating with PU
M Matching matrix
B Time-slot allocation matrix
G Price allocation matrix
PULIST PT’s preference list
SULISTq STq’s preference list
δ PT’s price step number

 PT’s time-slot step number
(b) μ(SUq)∈(P ∪ {∅}),
(c) μ(SUq)=PU and μ(PU)=SUq if m,q=1, for =1, . . . , LPU and q=1, . . . , LSU,
(d) μ(SUq)=∅ if m,q=0, for =1, . . . , LPU,
(e) μ(PU)=∅ if m,q=0, for q=1, . . . , LSU.
In the above definition, (a) implies that a PU is matched to a single SU or no PU, i.e., μ(PU)=∅,
(b) implies that a SU is matched to a single PU or no source, i.e., μ(SUq)=∅, (c) implies that if
PU is matched to SUq, then SUq is also matched to PU and m,q=1, (d) implies that if m,q=0
then SUq is not matched and (e) implies that if m,q=0 then PU is not matched .
We also define an LPU×LSU price allocation matrix G with gi,j=ξi,j , and an LPU×LSU time-slot
allocation matrix B with bi,j=βi,j , and where gi,j=bi,j=0 if mi,j=0. We denote the price and time-
slot allocation matrices with continuous elements as Gcont and Bcont respectively. Mathematically,
this implies that the elements of Gcont and Bcont, respectively take values from the sets {gconti,j =ξi,j∈
R:0≤ξi,j≤1} and {bconti,j =βi,j∈R:0≤βi,j≤1}.
Now the main goal for each primary and secondary user is to ensure their minimum rate require-
ments are satisfied. When this is achieved, the secondary goal is to maximize their utility functions.
Note that the secondary goals for the primary and secondary users cannot be achieved simultaneously,
as a higher utility for the primary user will result in a lower utility for the matched secondary user,
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the primary users, i.e. focus on maximizing the primary users’ utility. As such, we now present the
optimization problem:
{Mopt,Bopt,Gopt}
=arg max
{M,Bcont,Gcont}
LPU∑
=1
LSU∑
q=1
m,qUPU,q(ξ,q, β,q)
s.t.:(a)RPU
,μ†()
(β
,μ†())RPU,req ,∀∈{1,2,...,LPU}
(b)RSU
q,μ†(q)
(β
μ†(q),q)RSUq,req ,∀q∈{1,2,...,LSU}
(c)RSU
q,μ†(q)
(β
μ†(q),q)−ξμ†(q),q k¯C0, (8)
∀ q∈{1,2,...,LSU}
(d) ∑LPU=1 m,q≤1,∀q∈{1,2,...,LSU}
(e) ∑LSUq=1 m,q≤1,∀∈{1,2,...,LPU}
(f) 0ξ,q1,∀ q∈{1,2,...,LSU}, ∀ ∈{1,2,...,LPU}
(g) 0β,q1, ∀ q∈{1,2,...,LSU},∀ ∈{1,2,...,LPU}
where μ†(p)=q if μ(p)=sq, and μ†(sq)= if μ(sq)=p.
Conditions (a) and (b) ensure that the minimum required rate for the PUs and SUs are satisfied1,
respectively. Condition (c) ensures that the SUs always receive a positive utility. Conditions (d) and
(e) respectively ensure that each PU will only be matched with one SU, and vice-versa. Finally,
conditions (f) and (g), respectively, ensure that the price and time-slot allocation values are kept
within their bounds.
In practice, a centralized controller is required to solve the optimization problem in (8). However,
there are three key issues regarding this approach:
• Overhead: The centralized controller will require the feedback on channel conditions and mini-
mum rate requirements from each primary and secondary user. Moreover, after the optimization
problem is solved, the resultant matching between PUs and SUs and price and time-slot allocation
1From the output of the optimization problem, it can be shown that the final time slot allocation numbers are chosen such that the
achievable rate for the matched SUs is equivalent to their minimum rate requirement, and the price-time slot allocation numbers are
chosen such that the utility for each matched SU is zero. We can thus present an alternate formulation accordingly, however, we leave
the formulation as described to make it clear that the SU’s rate and utility requirements are satisfied.
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numbers will then have to be transmitted to the corresponding users. The amount of overhead
required for this increases with the number of users, and can be quite high, rendering it
impractical.
• Complexity: The optimization problem is non-linear, and requires an exhaustive search over all
possible matching, price and time-slot allocation combinations. Such a problem is known to be
NP-hard [5].
• Selfish Users: We assume all the primary and secondary users are selfish2, which means their
goal is to always maximize their own utilities, then the outcome of the optimization problem
may not be in the best interests of at least one of these users. Selfishness is considered as an
inherent behavior of distributed and intelligent users. There are also privacy issues for which a
centralized approach may not be ideal.
To address these issues, we propose a distributed low-complexity algorithm, which accounts for
selfish users. As we will demonstrate in Section V, our algorithm can achieve a performance close
to the solution of the optimization problem in (8) for practical system parameters.
IV. PROPOSED DISTRIBUTED MATCHING ALGORITHM
In this section, we describe the proposed algorithm, which determines spectrum access for each
(PT,PR) and (ST, SR) pair.
A. Received SNR Assumptions
We first describe two scenarios that will be considered in the proposed algorithm, characterized
by different assumptions on the received SNR at the transmitters and receivers.
1) Complete Received SNR: In the first scenario, PT has perfect knowledge of the instantaneous
received SNRs in ΓDirPR and
{
ΓPT−STq ,ΓSTq−PR
}LSU
q=1
. Moreover, STq has perfect knowledge of the
instantaneous received SNRs in the expressions
{
ΓSRq,
}LPU
=1
. As such, PT and STq are able to
respectively calculate their instantaneous rates in (1) and (5).
2) Partial Received SNR: In the second scenario, PT has knowledge of the average received SNRs
in the term
{
γSTq
dαSTq,PR
}LSU
q=1
and the instantaneous received SNRs in the terms ΓDirPR and
{
ΓPT−STq
}LSU
q=1
.
Moreover, STq has perfect knowledge of the instantaneous received SNRs in the term
{
ΓSRq,
}LPU
=1
.
As such, PT is able to calculate its instantaneous conditional rate, given by the expectation of the
rate in (1), with respect to {hPT,STq}LSUq=1 , while STq is able to calculate its instantaneous rate in (5).
2Selfish users are a common assumption in cognitive radio literature [30].
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For both complete and partial received SNR scenarios, note that each PT and ST does not have
knowledge of the instantaneous received SNRs corresponding respectively to the other PTs and STs.
Moreover, the instantaneous received SNRs can be obtained through standard channel estimation
techniques.
B. Users Preference Lists
Each PT has a preference list of STs which can cooperatively relay the PT’s message such that
it obtains a rate greater than its minimum rate requirement. In particular, the preference list for PT
is given by
PULIST={(STφ(j), SRφ(j))}Kj=1 (9)
where φ(·) is a function φ:{1, . . . , K}→{1, . . . , LSU} satisfying
{
RPU,φ(q)(ξ,φ(q), β,φ(q))RPU,req
}K
q=1
(10)
for the complete received SNR scenario, and the conditions
{
EhSTφ(q),PRφ(q)
[
RPU,φ(q)(ξ,φ(q), β,φ(q))
]
RPU,req
}K
q=1
(11)
for the partial received SNR scenario. The function φ(·) also satisfies the ordering
UPU,φ(1)(ξ,φ(1), β,φ(1))>. . .>UPU,φ(K)(ξ,φ(K), β,φ(K)), implying that the first ST in the list
provides the largest utility. Moreover, K is the number of (ST, SR) pairs satisfying these conditions.
Similarly, each ST has a preference list of PTs which, if it transmits in the spectrum band occupied
by the (PT,PR) pair in the list, obtains a rate greater than its minimum rate requirement and a utility
greater or equal to zero. In particular, the preference list for STq is given by
SULISTq=
{
(PTψq(),PRψq())
}Vq
=1
(12)
where ψq(·) is a function ψq:{1, . . . , Vq}→{1, . . . , LPU} satisfying the conditions
{
RSUq,ψq()(βq,ψq())RSUq ,req
}Vq
=1
(13)
and {
USUq,ψq()(ξq,ψq(V), βq,ψq())0
}Vq
=1
(14)
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with the ordering USUq,ψq(1)(ξq,ψq(1), βq,ψq(1))>. . .>USUq,ψq(Vq)(ξq,ψq(Vq), βq,ψq(Vq)). The ordering thus
implies that the first PT in the list provides the largest utility. Moreover, V is the number of
(PT,PR) pairs satisfying these conditions.
In practice, the instantaneous channels can be measured by utilizing common channel estimation
techniques [37]. One possibility is for this channel estimation to be sent via control channels, as
considered in [1, 12].
C. Proposed Algorithm to Determine the Matching, Price and Time-slot Allocation Matrices
The key idea of the proposed algorithm is that each (PT,PR) pair trades with the (ST, SR) pair,
which provides the highest utility, through both cooperative relaying and monetary payment. This
trading will be done by negotiating on the price and time-slot allocation numbers {ξ,q, β,q}LPU=1 LSUq=1 .
We say PT makes an offer of (ξ,q, β,q) to STq to imply that PT is willing to allow STq to transmit,
in exchange for STq (i) cooperatively relaying PT’s message with time slot allocation number β,q
and, (ii) providing a monetary payment with price allocation number ξ,q.
The specific details of the main algorithm are given in Table II. Note that the main algorithm calls
upon the function3 ‘Proposal Update Unit (PUU)’, denoted as PUU(·, ·, ·), and detailed in Table III.
Note that the PUU provides an intelligent response for each PU after its offer is rejected by a SU.
To summarize the main algorithm (MA), each PT will first make an offer to the ST, which is first
in its preference list (MA-Step 2-1). The ST will then check if the offering PT is in it’s preference
list (MA-Step 2-2-1). If it is, and the ST is already matched with another PT, the ST has two
choices: (a) if the offering PT can provide a better utility than the ST’s current matching, then the
ST will reject its current matching in favor of the new matching (MA-Step 2-2-1-a-i), or (b) if the
offering PT can not provide a better utility than the ST’s current matching, the ST will reject the
PT’s offer (MA-Step 2-2-1-a-ii). If the ST is not matched, then the ST will be matched with the
offering PT (MA-Step 2-2-1-b). If the offering PT is not in the ST’s preference list, the ST will
reject the offering PT (MA-Step 2-2-2). The algorithm will then repeat this procedure with each PT
until no more matchings are possible.
Note that if the ST rejects a PT, then the proposal update unit (PUU) will be activated, and the
PT will either (i) decrease its price allocation number by a price step number δ (PUU-3), or (ii)
3Note that the PUU is required in the algorithm as we are considering both monetary and rate factors in the utility function. This
is in contrast to our conference paper [29], which did not have a PUU as monetary factors were not considered.
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TABLE II
Main Algorithm (MA)
Step 1: Initialization. (Parameter setting and list construction)
(1) Set (ξk,q, βk,q)=(ξinit, βinit), for k=1, . . . , LPU, eq=1, . . . , LSU.
(2) Set the price step number δ.
(3) Set the time-slot step number .
(4) Construct PUs’s preference list, PULISTk, based on (ξinit, βinit),
for k=1, . . . , LPU.
(5) Construct SUs’s preference list, SULISTq , based on (ξinit, βinit),
for q=1, . . . , LSU.
(6) Construct the list of all PTs which are not matched, denoted by
MATCH={PT1, . . . ,PTLPU}.
(7) Set the indexing parameter =1.
Step 2: Find a suitable ST for each PT(PUs and SUs dynamic negotia-
tion)
(1) PT makes an offer of (ξ,q, β,q) to the first ST in its preference list
PULIST. Let us denote this ST as STq . If (ξ,q, β,q) =(ξinit, βinit), then
STq updates its preference list based on (ξ,q, β,q) and reorder its preference
list based on the new update.
(2)
1) If PT is in STq’s preference list, then
a) If STq is already matched to a primary transmitter, denoted by
PTcurr, then
i) If PT is higher up than PTcurr on STq’s preference list
SULISTq then
- SUq and PU are matched. Remove PU from
MATCH.
- Update (ξcurr,q, βcurr,q,MATCH,PULISTcurr) by ex-
ecuting the Proposal Update Unit, ie.,
(ξcurr,q, βcurr,q,MATCH,PULISTcurr)
=PUU (ξcurr,q, βcurr,q,MATCH,PULISTcurr).
ii) Else
- Update (ξ,q, β,q,MATCH,PULIST)
by executing the Proposal Update Unit, ie.,
(ξ,q, β,q,MATCH,PULIST)
=PUU (ξ,q, β,q,MATCH,PULIST).
b) Else
- SUq and PU are matched. Remove PU from MATCH.
2) Else
- Update ξ,q, β,q,MATCH,PULIST by executing the Pro-
posal Update Unit, ie.,
(ξ,q, β,q,MATCH,PULIST)
=PUU(ξ,q, β,q,MATCH,PULIST).
3) If PULIST=∅, remove PT from MATCH, and go to Step 2-3, else
go to Step 2-1.
(3) If no more matchings are possible, i.e., MATCH=∅, then go to Step 4.
Else go to Step 2-1 for each PT which is not matched, i.e., go to Step 2-1
with PT being the PT corresponding to the first entry in MATCH.
Step 4: End of the algorithm
decrease its time slot allocation number by a time slot-step number  (PUU-4), depending on which
option maximizes the PT’s utility, and assuming a positive price and time-slot allocation number
and the minimum data rate requirement for the PT is satisfied.
We observe that the proposed algorithm produces a matching, price allocation, and time-slot
allocation matrix. Note that the price and time-slot allocation matrix have non-zero entries, which
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TABLE III
Proposal Update Unit (PUU)
Input
(1) Current price allocation number ξOld,q .
(2) Current time-slot allocation number βOld,q .
(3) Current MATCHLISTOld
(4) Current PUOld ’s preference list PULISTOld .
Output
(1) Updated price allocation number ξNew,q .
(2) Updated time-slot allocation number βNew,q .
(3) Updated MATCHLISTNew
(4) Updated PU’s preference list PULISTNew .
Procedure
(1) If ξOld,q − δ≤0
1) βNew,q =max
(
βOld,q − , 0
)
.
2) ξNew,q =ξ
Old
,q .
(2) Else if ξOld,q − δ>0 and RPU,q
(
βOld,q − , ξ,q
)≤RPU,req
1) βNew,q =β
Old
,q .
2) ξNew,q =ξ
Old
,q − δ.
(3) Else if UPU,q
(
βOld,q , ξ
Old
,q − δ
)
<UPU,q
(
βOld,q − , ξOld,q
)
1) βNew,q =β
Old
,q − .
2) ξNew,q =ξ
Old
,q .
(4) Else
(
UPU,q
(
βOld,q , ξ
Old
,q − δ
)
≥UPU,q
(
βOld,q − , ξOld,q
))
1) βNew,q =β
Old
,q .
2) ξNew,q =ξ
Old
,q − δ.
(5) Update the old preference list PULISTOld for (PT,PR) based on
the updated
(
ξNew,q , β
New
,q
)
, to form a new preference list PULISTNew .
(6) Update the old MATHLISTOld by putting PU at the end of the
list, to form a new MATCHLISTNew.
take values from a discrete set, in contrast to the continuous set considered in the optimization
problem in (8). This is due to the update procedure, where the price and time-slot allocation numbers
change according to the price and time-slot step numbers δ and . We denote the price and time-
slot allocation matrices with discrete elements corresponding to the particular ξinit, βinit, δ and 
values as Gdisc(ξinit, δ) and Bdisc(βinit, ) respectively. Mathematically, the elements of Gdisc(ξinit, δ)
and Bdisc(βinit, ) respectively take values from the sets {gdisci,j =ξi,j∈ξinit−mδ:m=1, . . . ,  ξinitδ } and
{bdisci,j =βi,j∈βinit −m:m=1, . . . , βinit
 }.
V. PERFORMANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS
We now analyze the performance of the proposed algorithm, and consider related implementation
issues. We first present some assumptions we will be considering in the analysis. To demonstrate
that the (PT,PR) pairs are motivated to participate in the proposed algorithm, we set the minimum
rate requirement of each (PT,PR) pair to be the rate of the direct PT to PR link. This is given for
(PT,PR) by RPT,PR=T log2
(
1 + ΓDirPR
)
. In this paper, we thus set RPU,req=RPT,PR .
We assume all channels experience Rayleigh fading, that randomly distributed as ∼CN (0, 1) and
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are constant during the duration of the proposed algorithm and subsequent T transmission time-
slots. This is a common assumption for auction based and iterative resource allocation algorithms in
wireless networks [38–40].
Moreover, the PTs and PRs are located on opposite sides of a square of length two, and thus
dPT,PR=2, while the STs and SRs are randomly located in an internal square of length one, located
within the square of length two. Moreover, the minimum rate requirements for each (ST, SR) pair
is given by RSU,req={RSUq ,req}LSUq=1=0.1 and all curves are generated based on averaging over 20,000
instances of the algorithm.
Finally, to demonstrate the benefits of the proposed algorithm, we also consider, in addition to the
centralized algorithm in (8), a random matching algorithm where the (PT,PR) pairs are randomly
matched with the (ST, SR) pairs, and denoted by μrnd. When LPU>LSU, LPU−LSU (PT,PR) pairs
will be randomly omitted from the matching, and when LSU>LPU, LSU−LPU (ST, SR) pairs will be
randomly omitted from the matching. Once the matchings are randomly established, each matched
PT-ST pair start an interactive negotiation process on the values of ξ,q and β,q. If the PT-ST pair
agree on these values, they will cooperate, otherwise there is no cooperation.
We observe that such a random matching requires a centralized approach, and is an upper bound to a
completely distributed random matching with no overhead. However, this is sufficient for comparison
purposes with the proposed algorithm. Note that the centralized and random matching algorithm
represent the two extremes in the amount of overhead and complexity required for any algorithm.
For all figures, unless indicated otherwise the ‘Centralized’ curves are generated by using (8), the
‘Proposed (complete SNR)’ curves are generated as described in Section IV-A1, the ‘Proposed (partial
SNR)’ curves are generated as described in Section IV-A2, and the ‘RMBN’ curves are generated
based on the random match basic negotiation methods as previously described in this Section.
A. Incentive Analysis for Selfish and Rational Users
A common and realistic assumption in cognitive radio networks is that the primary and secondary
users are selfish and rational (see e.g., [1] and [30]). Selfishness implies that users compete with
each other to maximize their individual utility function, with no regard for other user’s utility, while
rationality implies that users always make decisions to increase their utility. It is thus important for
the proposed algorithm to provide, incentive for the users to participate in the proposed algorithm,
by taking into account the selfish and rational nature of the users.
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1) Accounting for Selfish Users Through Stable Matching: We first prove that the proposed
algorithm takes into consideration the selfish nature of the users, by showing that a stable matching
is produced. To define a stable matching4, we will first define a matching, which is blocked by an
individual, and a matching which is blocked by a pair. To do this, we consider p∈P and sq∈S,
where μ(p) 	=sq and μ(sq) 	=p. A matching μ is blocked by an individual p (sq) if p (sq) prefers
not to be matched, than being matched with its current partner under μ. Mathematically, for p, this
implies that RPU
,μ†(p)
(β,μ†(p))<RPU,req , while for sq, this implies that RSUq,μ†(sq)(βμ†(sq),q)<RSUq,req
or USU
q,μ†(sq)
(ξμ†(sq),q, βμ†(sq),q)<0.
A matching μ is blocked by pair (p, sq) if (i) it is not blocked by individual p and sq, and (ii)
there exists a ξ,q and β,q such that p and sq can both achieve a higher utility if they were matched
together, as opposed to their current matching under μ. The latter condition, thus mathematically
implies that
UPU
,μ†(p)
(ξ,μ†(p), β,μ†(p))<UPU,q(ξ,q, β,q)
USU
q,μ†(sq)
(ξμ†(sq),q, βμ†(sq),q)<USUq,(ξ,q, β,q). (15)
A matching μ is then defined as stable, under the price and time-slot allocation matrices5 G and
B, if it is not blocked by any individual or any pair. Given this definition, we present the following
theorem.
Theorem 1: The proposed algorithm in Section IV-C produces a stable matching, under
Gdisc(ξinit, δ) and Bdisc(βinit, ).
Proof: See Appendix A.
Theorem 1 is important because it states that the proposed algorithm results in a matching, where
any matched (PT,PR) and (ST, SR) pair will not both achieve a higher utility than if they were to
respectively partner with any other (ST, SR) and (PT,PR) pair.
2) Accounting for Rational Users Through Utility Maximization: It is also important that the
proposed algorithm takes into account the rational nature of the users. This first means that each PU
and SU will obtain at least a better utility if they participated in the algorithm compared to if they
were unmatched. This is equivalent to one of the stable matching conditions; that the matching is not
4We extend the common definition of stable matchings [41] to incorporate the price and time-slot allocation numbers
5In general, G and A can have continuous elements as considered in Section III, or discrete elements as considered in Section IV.
Any analysis involving the matching μ thus has to also consider the domain of the price and time-slot allocation matrices in order to
be meaningful.
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blocked by an individual, and was proved in Theorem 1. The second is that at each iteration of the
algorithm, each PU and SU should always choose the user, which provides the highest utility. This
can be directly observed in MA-Step 2-1 for each PU, and MA-Step 2-2-1-a-i and MA-Step 2-2-1-b
for each SU. This implies that none of these matched selfish PUs and SUs have any incentive to
deviate from the matching produced by the proposed algorithm.
B. Utility Performance
We now investigate the utility performance of the proposed algorithm. To do this, we first present
the following lemma:
Lemma 1: The utility for every (PT,PR) pair in the stable matching, produced by the proposed
algorithm in Section IV-C, is greater than or equal to the utility obtained through a stable matching
produced by any algorithm, under Gdisc(ξinit, δ) and Bdisc(βinit, ).
Proof: See Appendix B.
Lemma 1 thus indicates that our algorithm produces the best stable matching, out of every possible
stable matchings, under Gdisc(ξinit, δ) and Bdisc(βinit, ).
A natural question now arises as to how our algorithm performs when compared with non-stable
matchings. To answer this, we first show that our algorithm produces a weak Pareto optimal matching,
denoted by μPareto. A weak Pareto optimal matching is defined as a matching where there exists at
least one matched (PT,PR) pair under μPareto, which obtains a utility at least greater than any other
matching, stable or non-stable. Given this definition, we present the following theorem:
Theorem 2: The proposed algorithm in Section IV-C is weak Pareto optimal, under Gdisc(ξinit, δ)
and Bdisc(βinit, ).
Proof: See Appendix C.
Theorem 2 indicates there exists at least one matched (PT,PR) pair under the proposed algorithm
that achieves a utility at least greater than the utility achieved under a non-stable centralized optimal
algorithm, under Gdisc(ξinit, δ) and Bdisc(βinit, ). This optimal algorithm is similar to the algorithm
in (8), but under Gdisc(ξinit, δ) and Bdisc(βinit, ), not Gcont(ξinit, δ) and Bcont(βinit, ).
In fact, the proposed algorithm can achieve a utility for every matched (PT,PR) pair very close
to the centralized optimal algorithm in (8), even under Gcont(ξinit, δ) and Bcont(βinit, ). This can be
observed in Figure 2, which plots the average sum-utility of all matched (PT,PR) pairs vs. time-
slot step number  for the proposed algorithm, the centralized algorithm in (8), and the RMBN
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. . . γSULSU=25 dB, LPU=2, γPU1=γPU2=5 dB, RSU,req=0.1, {RPU,req=RPT,PR}
LPU
=1 , c¯=1, k¯=1 and α=4.
algorithm. Note that the average sum-utility corresponds to the sum over all utilities achieved
by the matched (PT,PR) pairs, averaged over the channel realizations, and given by UPUΣ,μ=∑
∈Pμ E
[
U,μ†()(ξ,μ†(), β,μ†())
]
, where Pμ corresponds to all the (PT,PR) pairs matched under
μ.
We first observe in Figure 2 that for the proposed algorithm, the complete and partial received
SNR scenarios achieve very similar performance, despite different channel assumptions. We next
observe that the proposed algorithm (i) achieves a sum-utility comparable with the sum-utility of the
centralized algorithm for sufficiently small , and (ii) performs significantly better than the RMBN
algorithm. For example, when the time-slot step number =0.1 and LSU=10, we observe that the
proposed algorithm with complete and partial received SNR achieves respectively (i) ≈97% of the
sum-utility of the centralized algorithm, and (ii) ≈193% sum-utility increase compared to the RMBN
algorithm.
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C. Rate Performance
As observed in Section IV-C and Figure 2, the proposed algorithm’s primary focus is on maxi-
mizing the PU’s sum-utility, while simultaneously satisfying both the PU’s and SU’s minimum rate
requirement. However, some networks may require that (i) only the rate is important and monetary
factors are not a consideration, and (ii) the SUs also prefer a higher rate, greater than their minimum
data rate requirement. For such networks, the proposed algorithm is flexible in adapting to these
design needs.
In particular, observe from (4) that increasing c¯ has the effect of increasing the contribution of
the monetary value in the (PT,PR)’s utility function. As observed in the Proposal Update Unit, this
has the effect of the PUs choosing to offer a lower time-slot allocation number, rather than a lower
price allocation number, to the SUs. This will subsequently result in a higher rate for the SUs, at
the expense of a lower rate for the PUs. Thus the parameter c¯ can be used to control the rates of
the PUs and SUs, in accordance with specific system requirements.
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This can be observed in Figures. 3 and 4, which respectively plots the average sum-rate of all
matched (PT,PR) pairs vs. c¯, and the average sum-rate of all matched (ST, SR) pairs vs. c¯, for
the complete received SNR scenario. Note that the average sum-rate of all matched (PT,PR) pairs
corresponds to the sum over all rates achieved by the matched (PT,PR) pairs, averaged over the
channel realizations, and is given by RPUΣ,μ=
∑
∈Pμ E
[
R,μ†()(β,μ†)
]
, where Pμ corresponds to
all the (PT,PR) pairs matched under μ. A similar definition can be made for the sum-rate of the
matched (ST, SR) pairs, denoted RSUΣ,μ. For comparison, we also plot the sum-rate achieved by a
centralized optimal algorithm. In particular, in Figure 3, the centralized algorithm produces a sum-
rate, which maximizes the total sum-rate of all (PT,PR) pairs, and given by substituting c¯=0 into
the optimal algorithm produced from (8). In Figure 4, the centralized algorithm produces a sum-rate
which maximizes the sum-rate of all (ST, SR) pairs, and is formulated in a way similar to (8), but
interchanging the (PT,PR) pairs with the (ST, SR) pairs in the optimization equation. This results
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in the optimization
arg max
{M,Bcont,Gcont}
LPU∑
=1
LSU∑
q=1
m,qRSUq,(ξ,q, β,q)
subject to the conditions in (8).
We observe in Figures. 3 and 4 that RPUΣ,μdecreases with c¯, while RSUΣ,μincreases with c¯, as
expected. This shows the flexibility of our algorithm in adapting to different primary and secondary
user priority levels. When c¯ is low, we observe in Figure 3 that the sum-rate of the matched (PT,PR)
pairs of our proposed algorithm achieves a high percentage of the optimal algorithm and significantly
greater than the RMBN algorithm. Similarly, when c¯ is high, we observe in Figure 4 that the sum-rate
of the matched (ST, SR) pairs of our proposed algorithm achieves a high percentage of the optimal
algorithm and significantly greater than the RMBN algorithm.
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D. Total Number of Matchings
The total number of matched (PT,PR) and (ST, SR) pairs is also an important consideration of
any matching algorithm, and is proportional to the total number of users which can achieve their
minimum rate requirements. Figure 5 shows the percentage of matched (PT,PR) pairs vs. the SU’s
SNR γST=γST1=γSTLSU , for different number of (ST, SR) pairs LSU. We observe that the percentage
of matched (PT,PR) pairs increases with γSU and LSU, due to the higher achievable rates that the
matched (PT,PR) pairs can achieve through cooperative relaying. Remarkably, we observe that the
proposed scheme can achieve a very high matching percentage at high SNR even when LSU=2,
i.e., ≥80% when γSU≥20 dB. Moreover, the proposed algorithm delivers a percentage of matched
users comparable with the centralized algorithm, and significantly greater than the RMBN algorithm.
Note that as the minimum rate requirement for the PUs is equal to the rate of their corresponding
direct link transmission without cooperative relaying, Figure 5 thus indicates that the PUs are well
motivated to participate in the trading framework with the SUs.
In practice, the unmatched PTs will transmit directly to their corresponding PRs and thus (PT,PR)
will achieve the rate RPT,PR . However, the unmatched STs will not be able to transmit at all. To
remedy this, various modifications to the proposed algorithm can be made, which are the subject
of future work such as integrating a fairness mechanism into the algorithm so each ST has a turn
transmitting, though at different times.
E. Convergence
We will now analyze the convergence behavior of the proposed algorithm, as shown in the following
theorem:
Theorem 3: The number of iterations required for the proposed algorithm to converge is upper
bounded by:
Imax=ξinit
δ
+
1

(
βinit − βMIN
)
(16)
where βMIN= min
=1,...,LPU
min
q=1,...,LSU
βmin,q and β
min
,q =
2RPU,req
T log2
(
1+ΓDirPR
+ΓRelayPR,q
) .
Proof: See Appendix D.
Theorem 3 implies that the proposed algorithm converges after a finite number of iterations, and
that this number is dependent on different parameters. For example, we clearly see that the number
of iterations for convergence decreases with  and δ, and increases with ξinit and βinit.
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F. Overhead
The proposed algorithm is distributed, and thus incurs significantly less overhead and complexity
compared to centralized algorithms. An exact analysis of the amount of overhead and complexity
is difficult, due to the dependency on a number of system parameters, such as the minimum sum-
rate requirements, the price and time-slot step-numbers and the initial price and time-slot allocation
numbers. We can however, find an expression for the upper bound on the maximum number of
communication packets between the PTs adn the STs, given in the following theorem:
Theorem 4: The number of communication packets between the PTs and the STs required in the
proposed algorithm is upper bounded by
Nmax=(a1LPU + a2F ) Imax (17)
=(a1LPU + a2F )
(
ξinit
δ
+
1

(
βinit − βMIN
))
where where a1, a2∈R+ and F=max{LPU, LSU}.
Proof: See Appendix E.
We observe in (17) that the amount of overhead, and thus the number of iterations, decreases
with  and δ. This is confirmed in Figure 6, which plots the total number of communication packets
exchanged between each PT and all the STs it communicates with, vs. time-slot step number ,
with the same parameters used in Figure 2. We see that the total number of communication packets
converge to a constant at sufficiently high . This is because if  is sufficiently large, the time-slot
allocation numbers are updated in the algorithm in such a way that the preference lists for each
(PT,PR) and (ST, SR) pair remain unchanged.
Denoting the random variable Y as the total number of communication packets as a function of
the user channels, Figure 7 plots the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of Y , PR (Y≤y), vs.
y for different number of secondary users LSU, where y is a realization of Y . We observe that the
proposed algorithm can achieve low overhead with high probability in various practical scenarios.
For example, when LSU=6, we observe that 90% of the time, a maximum of only 15 communication
packets are exchanged between the PUs and the SUs.
Figures. 2 and 6, and (17) reveal that  can be designed to ensure an acceptable amount of overhead
and achievable rate. In particular, we observe from (17) and Figure 6 that decreasing the overhead by
increasing  or δ will result in both a lower magnitude and number of price and time-slot allocation
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numbers which can be offered to the (ST, SR) pairs from the (PT,PR) pairs. This will result in
a lower utility for the (PT,PR) pairs, and increase the chance the STs will reject any offer made.
This can be observed in Figure 2, which illustrates a tradeoff between performance and overhead.
A similar argument can be made for decreasing ξinit and βinit. In practice, each PU can adaptively
adjust it’s time-slot step number  based on (i) the acceptable sum utility of PUs in Figure 2 and (ii)
the tolerable average number of required communication packets in Figure 6.
We note that the packet length required for communication between the PTs and the STs is very
short. In particular, assuming that ξinit, βinit, δ and  are initially known to all users, each PT is only
required to send one bit to the first ST in its preference list indicating an offer, and the corresponding
ST only needs to send one bit back to the offering PT indicating either acceptance or rejection. The
required time for the proposed algorithm execution is thus very small. Specifically, if high speed
control channels such as 802.11 are used, the average time for execution is in the order of 100-200
nsec [42]. As demonstrated in Figure 6, the total number of communication packets for each PT
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can be designed to be reasonably small, and thus given the short packet lengths, the total running
time and amount of overhead from the proposed algorithm can be quite small.
G. Complexity
We now present a lemma for the complexity of the centralized, proposed and RMBN algorithms:
Lemma 2: The complexity of the centralized algorithm is given by
{ O ( LSU!
(LSU−LPU)!2
2LSU+LPU
)
, if LSU≥LPU;
O
(
LPU!
(LPU−LSU)!2
2LSU+LPU
)
, if LSU<LPU,
(18)
of the proposed algorithm by O (LPULSU), and of the RMBN algorithm by O (LPU).
Proof: See Appendix F.
We observe that the centralized method has a significantly larger complexity than both the proposed
and randomized algorithm. Its complexity is increasing exponentially with the number of primary
and secondary users. In contrast, the proposed algorithm complexity only increases linearly with the
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number of primary or secondary users.
VI. CONCLUSION
We proposed a distributed algorithm for spectrum access, which guarantees that the PUs’ and SUs’
rate requirements are satisfied. Our algorithm hinges on a trading framework between the PUs and
SUs, where the PUs and SUs negotiate on combined time-slot and monetary compensation. Time
slot allocation numbers determine the amount of transmission time dedicated for SU transmission,
and the length of time the SUs will cooperative relay the PUs’ data. The price allocation numbers
express the amount of monetary compensation that SU provide for PUs in exchange of spectrum
usage. The proposed algorithm, was based on a dynamic bilateral negotiation between the PUs and
SUs that resulted in a stable outcome. We proved that the proposed algorithm results in the best
possible stable matching and is weak Pareto optimal. A numerical analysis also revealed that the
distributed algorithm achieves a performance comparable to an optimal centralized algorithm, but
with significantly less overhead and complexity.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
We first define some notations. Without loss of generality, let {(PTPR)}Lμprop=1 be the set of
matched (PT,PR) pairs at the conclusion of the algorithm. We first consider p1=(PT1,PR1), with
the preference list at the conclusion of the algorithm denoted by PULIST1={s1, . . . , sK1}. Associated
with this preference list are the final price and time-slot allocation numbers associating p1 and
{sq}K1q=1, and denoted respectively by {ξprop1,q }K1q=1 and {βprop1,q }K1q=1. Note that due to the ordering of
the preference list, the proposed algorithm will match p1 with s1. We now prove that the proposed
algorithm doesn’t produce any blocking pairs by contradiction. Assume that p1 and sq, for some
q=2, . . . , K1, constitute a blocking pair. This implies that there exists a ξ1,q and β1,q such that
UPU1,q(ξ1,q, β1,q)>UPU1,1(ξ
prop
1,1 , β
prop
1,1 ), implying that either (i) ξ1,q>ξ
prop
1,q , (ii) β1,q>β
prop
1,q or (iii) both
ξ1,q>ξ
prop
1,q and β1,q>β
prop
1,q . Due to the ordering of the preference list PULIST1, this cannot occur as
there would have been a period during the algorithm when sq initially rejected p1 at this β1,q and/or
ξ1,q value, as sq received a better offer from another (PT,PR) pair. For this scenario, p1 and sq thus do
not form a blocking pair. A similar proof can be made for the other ps, for =2, . . . , LPU. The stable
matching proof follows by noting that there are no blocking individuals due to the preference lists,
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i.e., no (PT,PR) and (ST, SR) pairs will be matched respectively with a (ST, SR) and (PT,PR)
pair not on its preference list.
B. Proof of Lemma 1
The proof is by contradiction. Denote μprop as the stable matching produced by the proposed
algorithm, and μalt as another stable matching. Then let us assume that for all (PT,PR) pairs, the
utility achieved under μprop is less than the utility achieved under μalt. W.l.o.g, consider (PT,PR),
and thus the previous statement mathematically implies that
UPU
,μ†alt()
(ξalt
,μ†alt()
, βalt
,μ†alt()
)>UPU
,μ†prop()(ξ
prop
,μ†prop(), β
prop
,μ†prop()), where (ξ
prop
·,· , β
prop
·,· ) and (ξ
alt
·,· , β
alt
·,· )
denote the price and time-slot allocation numbers under matching μprop and μalt respectively. Denoting
q=μ†alt(), this means that under the proposed matching μprop, PT offered (ξalt,μ†alt(), β
alt
,μ†alt()
) to
STq but was rejected. There are two ways for this to happen. The first is if under matching μprop,
PT with proposal (ξalt,μ†alt(), β
alt
,μ†alt()
) was not in STq’s preference list SULISTq. However, this
contradicts the implicit assumption that under matching μalt, PT with proposal (ξalt,μ†alt(), β
alt
,μ†alt()
)
is in STq’s preference list, and thus should also be in STq’s preference list under matching μprop.
The second alternative is if under matching μprop, STq rejected PT in favor of another primary
transmitter, denoted as PTν . W.l.o.g., let us assume that this is the first rejection that has taken place
under μprop. This implies that PTν prefers STq to every other (ST, SR) pair, and thus the matching
μalt is blocked by pair ((PTν ,PRν), (STq, SRq)), which contradicts the assumption that μalt is a
stable matching.
C. Proof of Theorem 2
We outline the proof for non-stable matchings, and note that the proof for stable matchings follows
directly from Lemma 1. The proof is by contradiction. Denote μprop as the matching produced by
the proposed algorithm, and μopt as an arbitrary non-stable matching. Then let us assume that every
matched (PT,PR) pair in μprop achieves a utility less than its utility obtained under matching μopt.
Mathematically, this is represented by {U,μ†prop()(ξprop,μ†prop(), βprop,μ†prop())<U,μ†opt()(ξopt,μ†opt(), β
opt
,μ†opt()
)}Lμprop=1 ,
where (ξprop·,· , β
prop
·,· ) and (ξ
opt
·,· , β
opt
·,· ) denote the price and time-slot allocation numbers under matching
μprop and μopt respectively. We consider three scenarios, defined by the relative number of matched
(ST, SR) pairs under μprop compared to μopt. Specifically:
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1) Same matchings: In this scenario, every matched (ST, SR) and (PT,PR) pair under μprop
is also matched under μopt. Consider the last (ST, SR) pair which is matched in μprop, and de-
note this pair as (STLμprop , SRLμprop ). Moreover, w.l.o.g. (STLμprop , SRLμprop ) is matched with (i)
(PTLμprop ,PRLμprop ) under matching μ
prop, and (ii) (PT1,PR1) under matching μopt. From the initial
contradiction assumption, note that under μprop, (PT1,PR1) prefers (STLμprop , SRLμprop ) with price
and time slot allocation numbers (ξalt1,Lμprop , β
alt
1,Lμprop
) than its current matching, which mathematically
implies that
UPU1,Lμprop (ξ
alt
1,Lμprop
, βalt1,Lμprop )>UPU1,μ†prop(1)(ξ
prop
1,μ†prop(1), β
prop
1,μ†prop(1)). There was thus a period during
the proposed algorithm where (PT1,PR1) offered a price allocation number ξalt1,LPU(>ξ
prop
1,LPU
), and/or
a time-slot allocation number βalt1,LPU(>β
prop
1,LPU
) to (STLμprop , SRLμprop ), and was rejected. However, as
(STLμprop , SRLμprop ) is the last (ST, SR) pair to be matched, this is a contradiction as (STLμprop , SRLμprop )
will not reject any offer from (PT1,PR1).
2) More primary user matchings: In this scenario, there are more (PT,PR) pairs which are
matched under μprop, then matched under μopt. The initial contradiction assumption is thus clearly
violated, as the un-matched (PT,PR) pairs which are matched under μprop, but not under μopt, have
a zero utility.
3) Less primary user matchings: In this scenario, there are less (PT,PR) pairs which are matched
under μprop, then matched under μopt. Every (ST, SR) pair which is not matched under μprop will
thus have a zero utility. However, at least one of these (ST, SR) pairs, denoted as (STq, SRq) will
obtain a positive utility under μopt. Combined with the initial contradiction assumption, this implies
that (STq, SRq) and (PTμ†opt(q),PRμ†opt(q)) form a blocking pair for μ
prop, which is a contradiction.
D. Proof of Theorem 3
From MA-Step 2-2-1-a-i and MA-Step 2-2-2 of the proposed algorithm in Table II, if STq rejects
the offer of PT, then PT will decrease its price allocation number β,q or its time-slot allocation
number ξ,q by executing PUU. The minimum possible price allocation number that PT can offer
STq is ξ,q=0, while the minimum time-slot allocation number that PT can offer STq is
βmin,q =
2RPU,req
T log2
(
1 + ΓDirPR + Γ
Relay
PR,q
) . (19)
PT will not decrease its time-slot allocation number to β,q=βmin,q − , since its minimum rate
requirement will not be satisfied. Thus the minimum possible time-slot allocation number that PT
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can offer in the algorithm is
βMIN = min
q=1,...,LSU
βmin,q . (20)
So in the worst case scenario, each PT, =1, . . . , LPU after  ξinitδ + 1

(
βinit − βMIN
) iterations
will not make any offer to any ST, and according to MA Step 2-2-3, PT will be removed from
the list of unmatched PTs denoted by MATCH in Table II. Thus the maximum number of iterations
that all the PTs will be removed from MATCH is given by
Imax=ξinit
δ
+
1

(
βinit − min
=1,...,LPU
βMIN
)
. (21)
E. Proof of Theorem 4
Following the proposed algorithm in Table II, the PTs and STs need to communicate together as
follows. In MA-Step 2-1, in the worst case scenario, all the PTs make an offer to all the STs, and
thus LPU communication packets are required. After receiving the PTs offer, the STs need to inform
the PTs whether they accepted or rejected the offers. This process happens in MA-Step 2-2-1-a-i,
MA-Step 2-2-1-a-ii and MA-Step 2-2-2 and thus F communication packets are required. Thus in the
first iteration of the algorithm, a maximum of LPU + F communication packets are required.
However, since in the next iterations some of the PUs are matched and also the length of the
preference list of the unmatched PTs is decreased, the number of communication packets will
decrease. Thus after the first iteration, the total number of communication packets at each iteration
of the algorithm is a linear function of LPU and F . The maximum number of iterations that the
algorithm ends is also known from Theorem 3. Therefore, the maximum number of communication
packets packets between the PTs and STs scales as (a1LPU + a2F ) Imax.
F. Proof of Lemma 2
For the centralized method when LPULSU, the proof follows by noting that the total number of
matching combinations between the PTs and STs is LSU!
(LSU−LPU)! , while the complexity of solving the
linear programming problem for all possible matching combinations is 22LSU+LPU [43]. A similar
argument can be made when LPU>LSU. For the proposed algorithm, the proof follows by noting
that the complexity is proportional to the total number of times the PTs communicates with the STs,
given in (17). For the RMBN method, the proof follows by noting that each PT communicates to a
random ST only once, and thus the complexity is proportional to the number of primary users LPU.
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